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**ABSTRACT**

Telecommunications policy makers in Western Europe face the dilemma of satisfying public demand for a wider range of television viewing alternatives without sacrificing national cultural integrity. The Dutch Parliament addressed this problem in 1984, 1985, and 1986 as it approved steps to implement the "Medianota," the comprehensive policy document on the media, and took subsequent steps to enforce it. The document provides protection for Dutch culture, the Dutch press, and the Dutch broadcasting industry. Among the goals accomplished by the Dutch policy are (1) avoiding cultural fragmentation by restricting non-Dutch advertising, non-Dutch satellite programming, and protection of television and film production; (2) meeting the needs of political minorities without alienating the majority of the country's population; seeking popular programming by advocating a third channel and expanding hours of the two existing channels; and requiring public affairs programming of the broadcast organizations to which the Dutch government allocates air time. While the media bill may not be considered model legislation by other countries because of the unique structure of Dutch broadcasting, it does contain the necessary policy elements for successful balance among vested interests, national cultural, and new technology. Notes, and a five-page list of references concludes the report. (DF)

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International Division

Culture vs. Technology: Mass Media Policy  
of The Netherlands Attempts a Balance

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Abstract

Telecommunications policy-makers in Western Europe face the dilemma of satisfying public demand for a wider range of television viewing alternatives without sacrificing national cultural integrity. The Dutch Parliament faced this problem in 1984, 1985, and 1986 as it approved steps to implement the Medianota, the comprehensive Policy Document on the Media, and took subsequent steps toward implementation. Policy concerning private reception of DBS programming remains to be addressed, but Dutch broadcasting has avoided cultural fragmentation even as it has authorized signal fragmentation among expanded cable offerings and a third national television channel.

Culture vs. Technology: Mass Media Policy  
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Introduction

Le Duc has recognized the dilemma faced by telecommunications policy-makers in Western Europe in satisfying public demand for a wider range of television viewing alternatives without sacrificing national cultural integrity.<sup>1</sup> The Dutch Parliament faced this problem in 1984, 1985, and 1986 as it approved the Medianota, the comprehensive Policy Document on the Media, and took subsequent steps toward implementation.

The Dutch Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Recreation, and Social Welfare itself had admitted in 1982 that satellite broadcasting "may threaten the very foundations of the Dutch broadcasting system," notably its pluriformity and non-commercialism. National legislation stood powerless against satellite broadcasting, it said.<sup>2</sup> Media critics also recognized that demands for new technology and commercial programming threatened this structure, which had served the social and political needs of the country for decades.<sup>3</sup>

Paramount in Parliament's consideration was the effect of the new policy upon the nation's unique broadcasting structure and, in turn, the government's ability to control the nature of programming transmitted by the system and by new media.<sup>4</sup> Since 1940, private broadcasting organizations reflecting the political, social, and religious spectra of Dutch life have been granted responsibility for the majority of the programming on government-operated broadcasting facilities.<sup>5</sup>

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to examine the new policy and the steps taken to reconcile the at times conflicting demands to accommodate new technology while protecting--and even promoting--the national cultural identity.

### Background

Dutch telecommunications policy has the potential of being a volatile issue. On February 27, 1965, the government resigned following its failure to agree on a broadcasting policy.<sup>6</sup> The country operated under provisional broadcasting legislation until the act of March 1, 1967, became effective.<sup>7</sup> As amended in 1977 and 1978, this act was thus basic policy when the Dutch government in March, 1979, asked the Scientific Board for Government Policy (abbreviated in Dutch as WRR) for advice concerning media policy. The board presented its report, entitled, "Coherent Media Policy," in August, 1982.<sup>8</sup> During the three-year interim, the Ministry of Welfare, Health, and Cultural Affairs had refused to discuss publicly mass media policy, pending its receipt of the report, a fact which critics saw as an alibi for a completely inactive government.<sup>9</sup>

Once it was in hand, the minister of cultural affairs, L. C. Brinkman, wrote the 20-page Medianota, a vast reduction from the 150-page drafts ministry employees had proposed. But if the 1979-1982 period had marked a blackout of official discussion of the policy, the following year before Minister Brinkman's report was issued in August, 1983, marked a period of intense lobbying by media representatives of Ministry officials and representatives to the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament.<sup>10</sup> Thus by the time the first plenary discussion of the Medianota took place on the floor of the Second Chamber on January 30, 1984, basic decisions had been made.<sup>11</sup> By

mid-1984 it was apparent not only that the government would not fall, but that Brinkman's Medianota, although amended, had become Dutch policy. The document clearly provides for increased, albeit controlled, international television programming; increased funding for and promotion of Dutch cultural affairs, and protection of existing media. Brinkman presented the final version to the lower chamber of Parliament on September 2, 1985.

### Philosophy of the Medianota

Structure of Dutch society more than new technology dictates provisions of the Medianota. Representatives in Parliament seek to protect access to the airwaves--or cable--of the broadcasting organizations reflecting their supporters' views. Thus freedom is valued within the government-controlled broadcasting structure, which, in turn, gives voice to the political, social, or religious views represented in Parliament.

Eight organizations are allotted time on television and radio, the five largest each having more than 450,000 members: AVRO (neutral), NCRV (Protestant), KRO (Roman Catholic), VARA (Social Democratic), and TROS (neutral). Organizations of 300,000 to 450,000 members, which thus receive less time, are VPRO (neutral/progressive), EO (fundamental Protestant), and VOO (neutral).<sup>12</sup>

The intertwined political/social/religious nature between government and broadcasting results in a degree of control, ironically legislated to insure freedom of expression, which few Americans would accept. Politically, then, Brinkman wrote effectively to a constituency which supports 14 parties:

We shall look first at everything that is old but deep rooted in our society and is worth protecting and revitalizing.

Many people rightly think that the rich variety of opinions and cultural diversity in general are important values in our society. It is equally important to have media which can give expression to this diversity. These outlets are also essential in present-day society to strengthen group ties and help people feel they belong. A pluriform society is something to be valued, a combination of different opinions and values which people hold and cherish and respect in others. To protect this society and provide outlets for this expression is, in the cabinet's view, one of the government's perpetual tasks.

It is not merely numbers or types of opinion, or the mode of expression of the richest, or the highest common denominator which is most important; the quality of a democracy is also measured by the room it allows to different minority groups.<sup>13</sup>

The minister of Welfare, Health, and Cultural Affairs set forth three objectives of the Medianota to implement this philosophy:

--To protect the large measure of freedom which is, rightly allowed, and to monitor and preserve the diversity of opinions expressed in broadcasting and the press;

--To protect Dutch cultural achievements and increase the possibilities for presenting them to the public;

--To expand the choice of programmes catering for [to] individual preferences;

all of which should be done using new technological advances and as far as possible to the benefit of employment in the country.<sup>14</sup>

Protection of Dutch cultural achievements and increasing employment not only insured favorable consideration in Parliament, but meant new technology would not be embraced without qualification.

The Dutch seek to protect a language and products in a country approximately the size of Maryland, bordering West Germany, and in the footprint of the world's satellites:

Dutch values, firms and products are losing ground and this is clearly detrimental to our culture, employment and store of knowledge. Though to a large extent the media know no national boundaries, many viewers and listeners still set store by Dutch products, either because they find these easier to understand or because they prefer to support them. For this reason the Government wants to make it compulsory (within the limits of EEC law) for both Dutch and foreign companies intending to exploit subscriber television in the Netherlands to produce a reasonable proportion of their material in the country.<sup>15</sup>

To offset the cultural invasion, the Medianota proposes extra annual subsidies for Dutch films of 2 million guilders (\$770,000), a figure which would rise to 4 million guilders in 1986. Dutch broadcasting is seen as a beneficiary as well of the subsidy, which would be financed from a tax on audiovisual equipment. Minority groups would receive one million guilders annually (\$385,000) for local broadcasting, thus implementing the philosophy that:

Television and radio are as important for furthering Dutch culture as the stage and the cinema screen. The complementary interaction of the media and cultural life (such as the performing arts and film) will therefore be promoted. The Government is in principle prepared to maintain cooperation between the cinema and broadcasting. Closer cooperation between other performing arts and broadcasting will be encouraged along similar lines. This point will in future be borne in mind when the performance of musical and theatrical organizations is being assessed and subsidies allocated. Radio and television broadcasts will thus become an essential part of the work of the various performing arts. This will also help to raise artists' work above the level of casual work done on the side.<sup>16</sup>

#### The Press

The Dutch press, like Dutch culture, received protection. It is obvious that the lobbying of the preceding year by the broadcast and press groups had been effective:

The existing media--newspapers and magazines, radio and television--will remain active and vigorous. New media, such as cable text and subscriber television, will be given ample opportunities for development. Non profit-making broadcast organizations . . . will continue to have broadcasting time to put across their views on radio and television . . . .



[B]usinesses and institutions . . . interested in doing so will be able to set up or continue to run newspapers, magazines, and media systems.<sup>17</sup>

Whether opportunities are "ample" for new media is debatable, but importance of the press is above political discussion, the Medianota observes. "Its interest will probably be best served by giving it opportunities to pay its own way."<sup>18</sup> Paying its own way, however, does not mean just the freedom to be in business, but a degree of protection.<sup>19</sup> Local or regional broadcasting may become commercial due to a new Socialist-Liberal coalition, but only if regional and local newspapers are compensated. Newspapers are not among the socio-cultural organizations to which licenses may be awarded for local broadcasting.<sup>20</sup>

The press is authorized to expand into teletext (together with NOS, the Netherlands Broadcasting Corporation), and alone or in partnerships in cable newspaper (alpha numerical display), cable text (videotex), and subscriber television (basic or add-on cable service).<sup>21</sup> Dutch publishers are ironically thus free to move into systems similar to their own financially unsuccessful Viewdata system, Krantel, which died in 1982 following a two-year experiment.<sup>22</sup>

Government subsidies for new or failing newspapers and magazines also continue to provide protection, the Dutch equivalent of the U.S. failing newspaper act.<sup>23</sup> An estimated 10 to 20 per cent of the country's newspapers receive the subsidies, offered to encourage a diversity of published opinions (even if chain owners occasionally have to juggle their books to show that one of their papers has a large deficit).<sup>24</sup>

Protection is equally evident in the broadcast industry.

## Satellites

It is obvious that the Dutch broadcasting's observation that satellite programming could threaten its existence is recognized in the Mediarota:

Although technical advances may have many advantages, as we break new ground we often pause to wonder if things will be better than before or if we will soon be ruled by technology. While the Government acknowledges that technology will continue to fulfill a useful purpose, and therefore wishes to make the new opportunities available for anyone wanting to use them, the Government also intends to guarantee protection of those values which, in light of its other policies, it does not wish to expose to untrammelled social and technical development.<sup>25</sup>

The heart of the problem is thus defined, but the Mediarota places no restriction on reception by household rooftop antennas of direct broadcast satellite transmission of television programming. (Fifty to sixty per cent of Dutch households are served by cable.) Yet the government is among 30 Western European countries which have filed protests with the International Telecommunications Union in an effort to stop plans by the government of Luxembourg to launch the 16-channel Coronet satellite which would threaten Eutelsat's monopoly on television and telecommunications.<sup>26</sup> Although the system would contract for programming from European distributors, it could reach households in addition to cable companies. Ostensibly prompting the protests is the U.S. technology of Coronet; in part, at least, the threat is DBS transmission itself.<sup>27</sup>

Furthermore, Eutelsat, Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries between 1986 and 1989 will launch satellites from which small dish reception is possible.<sup>28</sup> But these systems will apparently respect the policy of Western European nations to transmit satellite programming only through cable channels in order to protect national broadcasting systems.

The Second Chamber had requested a policy allowing easier access for

foreign television programs on Dutch cable television. Thus the Medianota provides that the programs taken from satellites may be "freely" retransmitted via cable television, but only subject to the following restrictions:

--Programs taken from satellite may contain no advertising specifically aimed at the Dutch public.

--Broadcast of the program in the originating country must also be by transmitter or cable system.

--Programs taken from satellites must be retransmitted simultaneously, without interruption "and as far as possible unabridged."

In the Netherlands, the programs must be transmitted to all those connected to the cable system (basic service rather than via add-on or pay service).<sup>29</sup>

How is it to be determined whether advertising is directed to the Dutch public? Four criteria are established, determining whether:

--The advertisements are spoken or subtitled in Dutch, although originating with a foreign-based distributor;

--Prices are given in Dutch currency in the advertisements;

--Addresses of commercial outlets in the Netherlands are given in the advertisements;

--The advertisements feature products available only in the Netherlands.<sup>30</sup>

However, members of the European Commission have announced judicial proceedings against these transmission restrictions, claiming they are in conflict with European media rights.<sup>31</sup>

Transmissions from the Eutelsat European Communications Satellite (ECS), already aloft, would be made available to cable companies, but only if the Dutch television channels were offered as well.<sup>32</sup>

Whether the signals are to be transmitted by cable or to rooftop antennas, the Netherlands is part of the multibillion dollar market for commercial television emerging in Western Europe, and the cable distribution system to serve it is rapidly being developed. NOS estimates 2.5 million households are served by cable, a penetration of 50 per cent; other sources place the figure as high as 70 per cent penetration, but they use a broader definition of cable household.<sup>33</sup>

Early in 1984 three distributors seemed poised to take advantage of such penetration: VNU, the Dutch publishing giant; Euro-TV, which had leased the Dutch ECS channel; and Filmnet, initiated by the Dutch film producer Rob Houwer. Each made significant efforts to consolidate its position, but by early 1985 Euro-TV had disappeared and VNU and Filmnet were merged, each holding 40 per cent of the stock in a new company, Filmnet Abonnee Televisie Nederland.<sup>34</sup> The new company will broadcast on two channels, with consumers paying about \$10 a month for eight hours of daily programming on one channel.<sup>35</sup>

International programming agreements are central to this service. United International Pictures, which includes Paramount, MCA-Universal, and MGM-United Artists, holds the remaining 20 per cent ownership of Filmnet Abonnee Televisie Nederland.<sup>36</sup> Filmnet gained access to a satellite channel through cooperation with Esselte, the Swedish publishing company, which had leased the Belgian ECS channel, and commenced transmission on March 29, 1985, in the Hague. By July 1985 it had reached 5 percent penetration in the Dutch capital.<sup>37</sup>

Sky Channel 9 began commercial television service to the Netherlands in May 1984. By March 1985 the Sky Channel reached 1.7 million households (4.4 million persons) via 21 cable companies, broadcasting from 1 p.m. to 1 a.m.<sup>38</sup>

NOS leased the Dutch ECS channel which Euro-TV forfeit, and broadcasting was started in October 1985 under the name "Europa TV" with commercial European EBU programming, produced by NOS in cooperation with three other EBU members: the Irish RTE, the Italian RAI and the German ARD.<sup>39</sup> To date, it is distributed only through Dutch cable works. The second service will be available in 1987 when the DBS satellite Olympus will be launched, and other users will transmit EBU programming, promoted by NOS.<sup>40</sup>

European viewers are thus at the threshold of receiving television fare on a scale enjoyed in the United States, but not without economic uncertainties.

#### Cable and New Media

To implement policy set forth in the Mediarota, Parliament in June, 1984, adopted Minister Brinkman's "Decree on Cable," whose major provisions seek to accommodate the desired balance between new technology and cultural preservation:

--Only one organization per community will be authorized to undertake local [cable and non-cable] broadcasting, and that group must be "socially and culturally representative."

--Every cable operator is obliged to carry the programs of the national broadcast organizations, of Europa-TV, of regional and local organizations, and of the Dutch-language Belgian channel, if it is normally within reach.

--Advertising is allowed on cable only on cable newspaper or cable text systems. (On the former, subscribers must read the pages in the sequence transmitted; on cable text, the subscriber may choose the sequence.) Subscription television with "moving images" may not broadcast advertising.

--Commercial enterprises and educational and religious organizations may apply for local or regional broadcasting licenses. They must, in turn, negotiate with cable operators for access to cable systems. Twenty per cent of the programming must consist of Dutch cultural fare.

--The national broadcasting organizations may prevent local and regional broadcasters from transmitting certain programs, retaining to themselves sports events and items of national interest.

--Subscription radio is authorized.<sup>41</sup>

Within three months of publication of the cable decree, Brinkman had granted licenses to ten subscription television companies, seventeen seeking to operate cable newspaper programming, and three initiating subscription radio ventures. It was widely believed that only some of the applicants would ultimately put their operations on the air. Indeed, by March, 1986, only one, Filmnet, was operational.

Provisions of the cable decree thus implement the philosophy of the Medianota pertaining to the new media:

The broadcasting organizations will thus not be given access to subscriber television, and companies in open competition will not be given access to the (national) broadcasting systems. The Government believes such a division of access to the media to be fair, because in the long term it will give industry and the broadcasting organization a secure claim to their own territory for some considerable time, without the danger of their becoming involved in a continuing political dispute about access to each other's territory. The only conditions based on the contents of this policy document which will apply to industry are dictated by the Government's belief that the distinction between broadcasting for the public as a whole and subscriber television for individuals must remain clearly marked. . . . Cable text, cable newspapers and subscriber television are

not the only new media forms, however; there are numerous other possibilities for the country's screens, to which the Government also intends to give as free rein as possible, in order to meet many different special requirements and given the audio-visual industry the encouragement which the Government believes it should receive.<sup>42</sup>

Examples of experiments which will be encouraged are interactive cable for tele-shopping and tele-banking. Access to cable will be encouraged for transmitting church services into homes, hospital broadcasting, and alarm services for the elderly.

The government sees its restrictions on the new media as being minimal, with competition of the marketplace to be the primary controlling factor. Yet it would be the nation's new Media Board which would allocate licenses to regional and local broadcasting organizations, and not provincial councils.

Not only would the new board act on regional broadcasting, but would decide whether new national broadcasting organizations should be permitted time on the government's radio and television channels. It would license cable newspaper, cable text, and subscriber television (not defined as broadcasting in the sense of over-the-air national television channels).

#### National Broadcasting

The Medianota is explicit in its protection of the national broadcasting organizations from encroachment by new media; fundamental change would be "undesirable," it states.<sup>43</sup> Not considered fundamental change is expansion of broadcast time on the two television networks by 20 hours per week--six hours after October 1, 1984, and 14 hours a week after October 1, 1985. The additional programming is expected to benefit the elderly, unemployed, and minorities.<sup>44</sup>

Parliament ordered fundamental change in 1984, however, when it authorized creation of a third Dutch television channel. Requests for such a channel were not new, but Parliament's action was surprising in the political arena after presentation of the Medianota.<sup>45</sup> (Earlier proposals for a commercial channel had always carried the restriction that advertisers could not influence directly program content, thus a strict separation of advertisers and producers was recognized.<sup>46</sup> In the Netherlands, support for a U.S. system of commercial television is unknown, but there is support for a system similar to the British BBC 1 and 2, ITV, and Channel Four.)

An argument which proved important for the third Dutch channel, and especially a commercial channel, is that more advertising money could be invested domestically to make all of Dutch broadcasting profitable. If no new commercial possibilities were opened, it was felt, this money would flow abroad.<sup>47</sup> Revenue from the new channel would benefit all of the broadcasting organizations as they carry out the mandated ratio of programming. (Each now must devote at least 20 per cent of its broadcast time to cultural programs, 25 per cent to information, 5 per cent to education, and 25 per cent to entertainment, ratios the Medianota seeks to maintain.)<sup>48</sup>

At least two of the Dutch broadcast organizations (TROS and VOO) are promoting commercial television. If they should form one new organization to fill an entertainment channel, then more air time would become available for the proliferating broadcasting organizations.<sup>49</sup> A recent NOS report, prepared at the request of Minister Brinkman, stated that the third channel is desirable and financially, technically, and organizationally feasible.<sup>50</sup> With this channel, Dutch viewers will have an alternative to the programming on the present channels.<sup>51</sup> NOS prefers a channel consisting of NOS programs and



those of the smallest broadcast organizations; time could also be reserved for special cultural and educational programs of the large broadcasting organizations.<sup>52</sup>

On August 30, 1985, the Dutch cabinet authorized establishment of the third national channel. It will be financed with new advertising money gained from "floating advertisement blocks" between (not within) programs. Until now, advertising blocks were allowed only before and after newscasts.

Advertising revenue is one of three sources of funding possible for expanded programming, as Le Duc has pointed out.<sup>53</sup> Increased license fees on radio and television sets and subsidies from general government resources would theoretically also be available. Despite the fact the Medianota states increased license fees on television sets "is definitely not anticipated," Parliament is considering raising the fees by 10 guilders (\$3.80) a year.<sup>54</sup> Limited general (budget) resources will not be used for subsidies, the policy document makes clear.<sup>55</sup>

Four additional provisions constitute the remaining major broadcasting elements of the Medianota:

--Broadcast organizations may turn to independent production facilities for 25 per cent of their programming "to make the audio-visual industry in the country more broadly based."<sup>56</sup> The Netherlands Broadcasting Corporation (NOS) studios at Hilversum, which produced all programming, would now produce the remaining 75 per cent.

--NOS would continue to provide news programming and cultural and educational broadcasts. The corporation would be given twice as much broadcast time as the major broadcast organizations.<sup>57</sup>

--Radio programming would cater more to listeners' demands, and a balanced listener spread among the five national stations is sought. Further moves toward establishing ideological difference among the stations will be encouraged.<sup>58</sup>

--Creation of the position of media ombudsman is to be studied.<sup>59</sup>

### Conclusions

The legal framework necessary to incorporate the new provisions and regulations of the Medianota was presented by Brinkman in his "Bill for a Media Act" (Media Bill) on February 15, 1985.<sup>60</sup> The act will take the place of the Dutch Broadcasting Act, the Receiving License Act, and the Press Act.<sup>61</sup>

However, Brinkman and his cabinet hope to thwart the wishes of Parliament on two primary issues: participation of the public broadcast organizations in subscription television and commercialization of the third channel which is scheduled to start transmission in mid-1987.<sup>62</sup> Through these two steps Parliament sought to allow the broadcast organizations to compete successfully against anticipated commercial enterprises.

Brinkman's cabinet had hoped to have the media act become effective by the beginning of 1986, a date which was unrealistically optimistic. Members of the Parliament's two chambers expressed disappointment at the 151 sections of the bill, about which the major political parties, including the coalition partners, quarrelled. NOS was a major critic, fearing loss of its role as the central broadcasting organization. It objected to more direct governmental influence in broadcast affairs rather than the promised low profile government.<sup>63</sup>

The major broadcast organizations expressed less concern because the bill, admittedly conservative, allowed them to continue much as before.<sup>64</sup> All parties agree subscription television poses no major threat; indeed, no major additional commercial market for subscription television is seen.

Dutch and European satellite programming, however, is anticipated; Dutch politicians were surprised by the sudden arrival of the commercial Sky Channel. Despite the rhetoric of the Medianota concerning the accommodation of new technology, the matter of rules or restrictions on the private reception of DBS programming remains to be addressed. Thus the liberalization of programming seen necessary by critics may be out of the hands of Dutch lawmakers.<sup>65</sup> The media bill in seeking to protect the existing media fails to accommodate fully those who wish to enjoy the fruits of new technology, specifically DBS. Yet, Dutch policy accomplishes several national goals:

--Dutch broadcasting has avoided cultural fragmentation even as it has authorized signal fragmentation. Dutch viewers will now receive satellite programming, local television, vastly expanded cable offerings, and the third national channel. But primacy of Dutch culture will be protected through the restrictions on non-Dutch advertising, non-Dutch satellite programming, and protection of television and film production.<sup>66</sup>

--Parliament in advocating the third channel, expanding hours of operation of the two existing channels, and authorizing local broadcasting appears to meet the needs of political minorities without alienating the majority of the country's population seeking popular programming.<sup>67</sup>

--Pluriformity of Dutch programming, guaranteeing access to all major public interest groups, is not only maintained but strengthened in the media bill, as would be expected in a parliamentary system dependent for its survival upon a coalition of parties.<sup>68</sup>

--The Dutch government requires public affairs programming of the broadcast organizations to which it allocates air time, but the press is even more representative of the nation's 14 political parties. The Medianota and media bill guaranteed the press financial security by allowing no commercial local broadcasting; if the Liberal-Socialist coalition prevails, newspapers would share in proceeds of local advertising. In either case, competition in advertising by the commercial channel will thus have diminished effect on the press.<sup>69</sup>

--Minimal annual increases (\$2.85) in license fees on television sets to finance expanded programming should prove politically acceptable.<sup>70</sup>

Parliament thus seems to have solved the dilemma of providing wider television offerings without sacrificing Dutch cultural values.<sup>71</sup> The media bill will continue to evolve as its elements are debated and approved, provisions sure to be studied by other West European legislators. While they may not consider the media bill and the Medianota model legislation because of the unique structure of Dutch broadcasting, the documents do contain policy elements observers have defined as necessary for a successful balance among vested interests, national culture, and the lure of new technology.

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<sup>1</sup>Don R. Le Duc, "Direct Broadcast Satellites: Parallel Policy Patterns in Europe and the United States," Journal of Broadcasting, 27: 100 (Spring 1983). Also see Le Duc, "West European Broadcasting Policy: Implications of New Technology," Journal of Broadcasting, 23: 237-244 (Spring 1979).

<sup>2</sup>"Broadcasting in the Netherlands," Fact Sheet on the Netherlands (Rijswijk, The Netherlands: Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Recreation, and Social Welfare, 1982), p. 5.

<sup>3</sup>Herman Cohen Jehoram, "The Unique Dutch Broadcasting System on the Eve of the Revolution in Teletechnics and the Freedom of Information," Netherlands Reports to the Eleventh International Congress of Comparative Law, Caracas, 1982 (Amsterdam: The Netherlands Comparative Law Association, and The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Instituut, 1982), p. 342.

<sup>4</sup>Jehoram is among those recognizing the uniqueness of the Dutch broadcasting structure, p. 341.

<sup>5</sup>Kees Van Der Haak and Joanna Spicer, Broadcasting in The Netherlands, Case Studies on Broadcasting Systems Series (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, in association with the International Institute of Communications, 1977), p. 6.

<sup>6</sup>Jehoram, "The Unique Dutch Broadcasting System," p. 330.

<sup>7</sup>The Netherlands Broadcasting Act (Hilversum, The Netherlands: Communications Department of The Netherlands Broadcasting Corporation, 1982). Provisions of the act are discussed in Radio and Television in The Netherlands (Hilversum, The Netherlands: Netherlands Broadcasting Corporation, 1982).

<sup>8</sup>See "Samenhanged Mediabeleid," WRR Report No. 24 ('s Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1982).

<sup>9</sup>Jehoram, "The Unique Dutch Broadcasting System," p. 338.

<sup>10</sup>Interview, Thomas H. Heuterman with Sikke Bakker, adjunct director of CEBUCO (Centraal Bureau voor Courantenpubliciteit van de Nederlandse Dagbladders), Amsterdam, June 14, 1983. The role of lobbying is also cited in the Policy Document on the Media (The Hague: Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, 1984), p. 9. All references to the Policy Document are to the English language edition.

<sup>11</sup>Interview, Thomas H. Heuterman with Harold de Bock, director, Audience Research Service of Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (The Netherlands Broadcasting Corporation), Hilversum, June 9, 1983.

<sup>12</sup>Radio and Television in the Netherlands, p. 22. See also "Zendtijdsverdeling 1984/1985," Omroepoduid, October 1984, Number 7 (Hilversum: NOS), p. 7.

<sup>13</sup>Policy Document on the Media, p. 3.

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>19</sup>Interview, Thomas H. Heuterman with Hans ter Hoeven, product manager (publisher) of Het Nieuwsblad van het Zuiden, Tilburg, the Netherlands, June 7, 1983. Also see Jehoram, "The Unique Dutch Broadcasting System," p. 339. Funding for protection of existing media such as the press competes with funding for producing a broader range of programming as Western European countries consider telecommunications policy, according to Le Duc, West European Broadcasting Policy, p. 242. He observes it is unlikely governments will raise individual receiver license fees much higher, or appropriate a greater percentage of general revenues to provide the programming. The remaining source of revenue would be increased advertising, which Dutch policy reserves at the local level for the press.

<sup>20</sup>Policy Document on the Media, pp. 14-15.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>22</sup>CEBUCCO, the Dutch newspaper publishers' organization, started Krantel in 1980 out of concern for competition from electronic journalism and a 10 to 20 per cent decrease in circulation experienced by Dutch newspapers. In one community, Appeldoorn, only 50 subscribers were connected. The publishers saw the system as having the potential to appeal to business subscribers, but not the public. When the Telegraaf of Amsterdam withdrew its support in 1982, the experiment was ended. Interviews, Thomas H. Heuterman with Bakker, Amsterdam, and ter Hoeven, Tilburg. The public also failed to embrace Krantel because consumers had to pay for modems and telephone line charges.

<sup>23</sup>Policy Document on the Media, pp. 3-4.

<sup>24</sup>Heuterman interview with Bakker, Amsterdam.

<sup>25</sup>Policy Document on the Media, p. 10.

<sup>26</sup>"Eutelsat Closes Rank," Cable and Satellite Europe, August 1984, pp. 10-12.

<sup>27</sup>"Luxembourg Draws Ire Over TV Satellite Plan," New York Times, national edition, July 4, 1984, p. 25.

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<sup>28</sup>"Europe Struggles to Get Its Satellites Aloft," Advertising Age, November 7, 1983, and Le Duc, "Direct Broadcast Satellites," p. 111. See also L. Blonstein, "DBS: Power to the People," Cable & Satellite Europe, January 1984, pp. 50-54, and "What's Up in Western Europe," Cable & Satellite Europe, January 1984, pp. 55-58.

<sup>29</sup>Policy Document on the Media, pp. 23-25.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>31</sup>"Kabelregels van Brinkman Juridisch Onhoudbaar," NRC Handelsblad, February 5, 1985 ("Brinkman's Cable Rules Judicially Untenable"), and "Kabelregeling Stemt Niet Overeen met Europees Recht," Volkskrant, February 2, 1985 ("Cable Decree in Conflict with European Right"). Also see Adformatie, January 17, 1985, p. 12. Adformatie is a Dutch professional journal for advertising and marketing. All three articles refer to the Greenbook, "Television Without Frontiers," published by the European Commission, Brussels, 1984.

<sup>32</sup>Policy Document on the Media, p. 11.

<sup>33</sup>L. Aldershoff-Gaemers and I. Broeders, "New Media Developments in Western Europe," AGB Research Report, August 1982, p. 75. Cable penetration is also discussed in "An EBU Survey on Cable Television in Europe," EBU Review: Programmes, Administration, Law, January, 1984, p. 35, and Harold De Bock, Kijken naar (Kabel) Kijkers (Hilversum: NOS, 1984), p. 14. Also see D. Hellingman, "De Elektronische Kiosk Is Open En Wacht Op De High-Tech-consument," Mediamarkt, February 1984, pp. 43-49.

<sup>34</sup>Adformatie, February 7, 1985, p. 17.

<sup>35</sup>Trouw, January 10, 1985. Trouw is a Dutch daily newspaper.

<sup>36</sup>Media-Info, June 1, 1984. Media-Info is a Dutch language new media newsletter published in Amsterdam.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., September 7, 1984 and August 2, 1985.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., October 19, 1984 and March 29, 1985.

<sup>39</sup>Volkskrant, January 12, 1985. Volkskrant is a Dutch daily newspaper.

<sup>40</sup>"European Programme on Satellite," Broadcasting News from the Netherlands, Number 2, 1984, pp. 1-4.

<sup>41</sup>L. C. Brinkman, Ontwerp Ministeriele Regeling ex 48 Omroepwet en 3 Sexies Telegraaf en Telefoonwet (Kabelregeling) (The Hague: Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, 1984).

<sup>42</sup>Policy Document on the Media, p. 10.

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<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 5, 21.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>45</sup>Concerning pleas for a third channel, see Toon Rennen, "De Plaats van Journalistieke Produkten in een Nederlands Omroepbestel," Massacommunicatie, Number 9, 1981, pp. 21-25 ("The Place of Journalistic Products in a Dutch Broadcasting System"), and Aanbevelingen voor een Toekomstige Omroepstructuur ("Recommendations for a Future Broadcasting Structure"), Report of the VPRO-commission Van Doorn, 1981, pp. 42-64.

<sup>46</sup>VPRO Report, pp. 46 and 54.

<sup>47</sup>Massacommunicatie, p. 24, and VPRO Report, p. 45.

<sup>48</sup>Medianota, p. 12.

<sup>49</sup>Massacommunicatie, p. 24.

<sup>50</sup>Mogelijkheden voor een Derde televisienet" ("Possibilities of a Third TV Channel"), NOS, Hilversum, June 22, 1984, p. 29.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>53</sup>Le Duc, "West European Broadcasting Policy," p. 242.

<sup>54</sup>Policy Document on the Media, p. 20.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., pp. 19-20.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>60</sup>L. C. Brinkman, Mediawet, Voorstel van Wet, Rijswijk, February 14, 1985 (Bill for a Media Act).

<sup>61</sup>L. C. Brinkman, Wetsvoorstel Mediawet, Memorie van Toelichting, Rijswijk, February 14, 1985 (Explanatory Memorandum).

<sup>62</sup>Media Bill, Section 30.

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<sup>64</sup>Don R. Le Duc, "Transforming Principles into Policy," Journal of Communication, 30: 200-201 (Spring 1980), discusses implication of conservative telecommunications policy.

<sup>65</sup>Chorom, "The Unique Dutch Broadcasting System," p. 51.

<sup>66</sup>Le Duc, "West European Broadcasting Policy," pp. 237-38, discusses cultural fragmentation.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 239. Le Duc discusses the problem of meeting the needs of political minorities at the expense of popular programming.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 241. Le Duc discusses the problem of providing for local broadcasting at the expense of national service.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 242. Le Duc discusses the issue of maintaining a healthy press in the face of limited advertising revenue.

<sup>70</sup>Edward W. Ploman, "Western Europe: International Ambiguity," Journal of Communication, 30: 183 (Spring 1980), discusses the difficulty of raising license fees.

<sup>71</sup>Le Duc, "Direct Broadcast Satellites," p. 100, addresses the matter of balancing cultural values and new technology.

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